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No matter how hard they try, some constitutional theorists can't avoid
being, at bottom, either democratic-foundationalists ("democrats") or
rights-foundationalists. In the first part of this essay, I will offer a third
way, insisting that at the heart of the American constitutional order is an
irreconcilable conflict between these divergent accounts, that attempts to
predicate constitutionalism on either democracy or rights cannot succeed.
Our constitution (a term I will use to mean our constitutional order--text
plus ... ) is, at the core, coreless. It cannot be resolved to a master
predicate. It cannot be reduced to democracy or to rights. It is, in this
way, the irreducible constitution.
The antifoundationalism of our constitution exists at many levels, and
may be understood through the concept of multiple repositories of power.'
It is fairly familiar to understand our structure of government (separation
of powers and federalism) as based in multiple repositories of power.
Furthermore, the structure of rights in American constitutionalism is also
heavily influenced by the avoidance of concentration of power. Although
consistent with multiple repositories of power regarding structure and
rights, constitutional theory itself-that is, systematic explanations and
defenses of our constitutional order--are usually based in a particular
conception of self-government, either a democracy conception or a rights
conception. It is the singular genius of American constitutionalism, I want
to suggest, that the tension between these two conceptions of self-
government is, by design, irresolvable. To reduce our constitution to
democracy or to rights would require accepting a foundationalist theory,
and our constitution rejects such a theory. In other words, multiple
repositories of power is our constitution's governing concept not only with
regard to the structure of government and the structure of rights, but also
with regard to the justificatory practice that undergirds those structures.
One might say that multiple grounds of justification is the constitutional
theory analogue to the role multiple repositories of power plays regarding
the structure of government and rights.
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. Yale University, 1982; J.D.
University of Michigan, 1986. For helpful comments, I thank Jill Fisch, Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming,
Jim Kainen. Dan Richman. Tony Sebok, Bill Treanor, and Ben Zipursky, as well as participants in the
Georgetown University Law Center Biennial Discussion Group on Constitutional Law and participants
in this conference.
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Part I will proceed in four steps. First: Constitutional theorists are, at
the core, either democrats or rights-foundationalists. Neither position, as
a foundationalist position, is consonant with our constitution. Second:
The tension between democrats and rights-foundationalists is based in
conflicting theories of self-government, one based in collective self-
government, the other in individual self-government. But neither theory
can be defended as foundational. Third: Our constitution renders these
conflicts irresolvable, not because tools are lacking to resolve them, but
because resolution depends on a type of foundationalist claim that our
constitution rejects. Importantly, such rejection does not assert the falsity
of the foundationalist claim that would be needed to support the primacy
of any of the above (democracy, rights-foundationalism, or either theory
of self-government). Rather, our constitution requires an agnostic position
regarding such claims. This agnosticism is based not in a truth claim for
agnosticism (that would be a good one!), but rather in second-order
arguments about governance. Fourth: One might infer from the preceding
that I am a rights-foundationalist and defender of the primacy of individual
self-government, that my insistence on multiple repositories of power as
central to our constitutional order commits me to a foundational position
on one side of the debates I have described. I will explain why this
charge is unfounded. One might also object that although rights-
foundationalism is problematic, it is problematic not because of the threat
of concentration of power, but because of the threat of anarchy. I offer
some further thoughts on this matter, as well.
After setting forth the theory of the irreducible constitution, I will try,
in Part 1I, to apply some of the understandings of that theory to problems
raised under the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. The religion clauses, I will maintain, primarily advance
the goal of religious pluralism. But not all plausible means toward the end
of religious pluralism are permitted. In particular, the establishment clause
works as a brake on majoritarian capture of the legislative process to
advance the dominant religion. Such capture risks the reduction of
religious pluralism. Conversely, when the majority acts to ease burdens
on minority religions, no such threat exists. My theory of the irreducible
constitution does, however, permit the government to compete with
separate fonts of authority for the allegiance of the people. This means,
among other things, that the government may operate schools and teach
secular values in those schools. Thus, the religion clauses are Exhibit A
for the theory of the irreducible constitution, for they enable the flourish-
ing of multiple religions, block the capture of government by a dominant





A. Conflicting Theories of the Constitution
No constitutional theorist denies the relevance of democratically elected
majorities, and none denies the relevance of rights retained by the
sovereign people. To some degree, therefore, all constitutional theorists
have hybrid positions, seeking the resolution of the democracy-rights
tension in various nuanced ways. Nevertheless, we can place theorists into
two camps based on what they focus on as foundational in terms of the
legitimacy of our constitutional order. Democrats predicate legitimacy in
decisions by the people acting collectively; rights-foundationalists
predicate legitimacy in rights that people retain as individuals. 2
Here are the democrats: Henry Monaghan, Robert Bork, and Antonin
Scalia are originalists, tracing authority back to constitutional framers.'
Larry Lessig is a translator, tracing authority back to constitutional framers
in a more expansive way than the originalists.4  Bruce Ackerman is a
synthesizer, tracing authority to the motivated American citizenry actin§
on matters of constitutional principle at key moments in our history.6
Akhil Amar is a popular sovereigntist, tracing authority to majorities.
John Ely is a representation-reinforcer, tracing authority to majorities
insofar as rights of political participation are unencumbered and minorities
are not systematically disadvantaged in politics.7 Samuel Freeman is a
contractarian, tracing authority to hypothetical agreements that citizens
could have made, accounting for various conditions, such as equality.
2. Two important caveats: First, many of the works cited below are descriptive rather than
normative, or are in large part descriptive rather than normative. They set forth what the authors
believe to be the best account of our constitutional tradition, rather than what the authors would prefer
our constitutional order to look like. Second, one might argue that I have placed some authors in the
wrong camp, or that some of the authors are closer to my view (the constitution cannot be reduced to
a master predicate) than I give them credit for. Nonetheless, the categorization that follows should
serve as a rough approximation of where people stand on the question whether our constitution, at its
core, protects collective decisionmaking with some exceptions for rights claims, or protects rights with
some room for the will of the people to govern.
3. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 CINC. L. REV. 849 (1989).
4. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395
(1995); Lawrence Lessig. Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
5. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
7. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
8. Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning. Democratic Interpretation. and the Constitution, 21 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIRS 3 (1992).
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Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein are civic republicans, tracing
authority to political decisions that account for various conditions, such as
deliberation and action in the public interest rather than in the interest of
factions. 9
These are all democrats, all theorists who, despite their differences and
their conditions, predicate our constitution on decisions made by elected
majorities (or supermajorities). Obviously some democrats--such as
Freeman-impose substantial enough conditions on the legitimacy of
collective decisionmaking that they start looking like rights-
foundationalists. Other democrats-such as Michelman and
Sunstein-also define democracy sufficiently thickly that it might be hard
to tell, at first glance, whether they are democrats or rights-
foundationalists. But whether the tracing to collective decisionmaking is
relatively direct (Amar; the originalists) or somewhat less direct (Lessig;
Ackerman), or whether the democracy predicate is thinly defined (Amar;
the originalists; Lessig; Ackerman) or more thickly defined (Ely a bit; then
Freeman, Michelman, and Sunstein much more), these theorists all
predicate our constitution on politics, on elected majorities or
supermajorities making decisions.
Rights-foundationalists, on the other hand, although sometimes making
concessions to democrats, adopt a different predicate, one of rights
retained by individual persons. Those retained rights-however de-
fined-are primary in our constitutional order; the will of the people is
secondary. Thus, Ronald Dworkin, Larry Sager, Jim Fleming, and Tom
Grey all point, in varying ways, to a constitution that seeks justice for
persons first, and that accomplishes democratic ends second.' 0
Neither foundational claim can succeed, however. Larry Sager has
carefully demonstrated how the democrats fail to account adequately for
significant aspects of our constitutional tradition." Alexander Bickel,
some time ago, showed persuasively how rights-foundationalism cannot
adequately account for the substantial deference given to collective
decisionmaking. 12 Sager has tried to defend this deference on terms
acceptable to rights-foundationalists, but the deference, it seems to me, is
thicker and deeper than Sager's model can account for. I will offer, in
part I.C, an account of our constitution that explains in a different way
from either Sager or Bickel why neither foundational claim can succeed.
9. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword-Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
10. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893 (1990); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV.
I (1995); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
I1. See Sager, supra note 10.




B. Conflicting Theories of Self-Government
The conflicting theories of our constitution discussed above have roots
in conflicting theories of self-government. All theorists of our constitution
share a predicate-ours is a government of the people, not of God or of
the King. All American constitutional theorists are democrats to this
extent, but whether one is a democrat as I have described above or a
rights-foundationalist depends, I believe, on which theory of self-
government one adopts as a foundation. Here, I will set forth the
conflicting theories of self-government and explain why neither should be
considered foundational. In part I.C., I will argue that our constitution
demands that this conflict, as well as the conflicts discussed in part I.A.,
be left unresolved.
Democrats appear to rest their claims on a theory of collective self-
government. The argument goes something like this: Individual self-
government might be a predicate of collective self-government, but it is
inadequate for the grounding of a polis. Individuals exist in a state of
nature; even if they can govern themselves through reason (thus giving
law to themselves in a Kantian way), this aggregation of individual self-
governors necessarily leads to a kind of chaos and war. It is only through
coming together as a-political community that individuals can harness their
powers of self-governance and live in peace. Our constitution is
predicated on a particular form of collective self-govemance--i.e., a
version of republican government, or representative democracy. Impor-
tantly, although individuals must cede self-governance to live in peace, a
representative democracy does not have to cede its self-governance (here
understood as a version of majoritarianism) to rights-foundationalists (who
want to limit majoritarianism) to live in peace. There might be other
reasons to mitigate the harshness of majority rule, but although individual
self-government must give way to collective self-government to achieve
basic social order, collective self-government does not similarly have to
yield to rights claimants for this reason.
Rights-foundationalists might offer the following answer: Individual
self-government is appropriately foundational; collective self-government
must build on that foundation. It is true, the rights-foundationalist
constitutional theorist might concede, that individuals must cede self-
governance to achieve social order. But collective self-government must
yield, as well, for the same reason. The democrat's argument that
collective self-government achieves a baseline of peace that appropriately
serves as the foundation for a constitutional order is incorrect. That
argument improperly assumes that rights claims are resolvable endoge-
nously by majority rule. But many claims of right--e.g., the claim of a
racial or religious minority to avoid discriminatory treatment--are best
1996]
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understood as state of nature claims. At their extreme, they are claims of
violence, of war. They are challenges to the majoritarian conception of
self-government. They say: To achieve peace, your majoritarian self-
government has to be ceded to a proper conception of justice just as the
self-governance of individuals had to be ceded to collective self-gover-
nance. On this view, collective self-government (instantiated in our
constitution through a form of republican government) is just a means of
achieving liberty for the individual (which must include those who lose in
voting as well as those who win). Individual self-government, thus, is
appropriately deemed foundational.
Is the conflict between theories of self-government that underlies the
conflict between constitutional theories resolvable within our constitutional
order? I think not, and I reach this conclusion not because tools aren't
available to resolve these conflicts, but because I believe that our
constitution requires that these conflicts be left unresolved. I turn now to
defending that claim.
C. The Irreducible Constitution
Our constitution is committed to multiple repositories of power through
and through. This can be seen at various levels. The structure of
government fractures power between federal and state, and at the federal
level among the three named branches. The rights listed in the constitu-
tion, and elaborated through our constitutional tradition continue this
commitment to fractured authority in various ways. Rights of political
participation (voting, speech, press, petition) ensure that political authority
remains in the hands of the citizens as political actors. Other rights help
preserve and develop nomic communities that may challenge the
government for the allegiance of the people, both by providing a base for
direct challenge and by securing a haven for separate normative cultures.
The religion clauses, the freedom of association, and rights instant in
family units all serve this function.
The core concern of multiple repositories of power is a negative one-it
is a nearly pathological fear of the concentration of power. The best way
to slip from a government of the people into a government of someone
else (such as the King) is to allow any locus of power to become too
strong. The best way to ensure a government in which the people retain
their sovereignty is to disable any locus of power from becoming too
strong. (In this way, antimonopolization laws are close to being
constitutionally required, at least regarding essentials. I recognize this
sounds quite odd, and I do not want to place too much weight on it, but
allowing individual corporations to control significant and essential areas
of the American economy risks the alienation of sovereignty just as
[Vol. 7:293
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allowing the President to become too strong or stripping people of the
franchise.)
Now comes the most difficult part of the argument. The multiple
repositories of power that are at the heart of our constitution in terms of
the structure of government and of rights are, I believe, inconsistent with
accepting a foundational theory of our constitution, i.e., a theory that is
foundationalist to the extent that it argues for either democracy or rights
as primary. This is not immediately apparent, for one could argue that
multiple repositories of power are not an end in themselves but rather are
a means to another end, such as democracy or rights-foundationalism.
That is, perhaps multiple repositories of power help support one of these
foundations, or help support values of one theory although another theory
is appropriately deemed foundational. Our constitutional commitment to
multiple repositories of power runs more deeply than this, however. To
accept either of these theories as foundational would be to privilege a
certain locus of political authority, and our constitution forbids such
privileging. For example, to accept the rule of the majority as foundation-
al, even if one adopts a thick view of democracy (such as Michelman or
Sunstein), is to accept the truth of the claim that collective self-govern-
ment is primary. But to accept such a claim we would run the risk that
collective self-government would be seen as worthy of the people's
allegiance in a deeper way than is individual self-government. Or, to take
the other case, to accept retained rights as foundational, even if one
accepts the role of collective rule in solving many problems, is to accept
the truth of the claim that rights retained by the people are primary. But
to accept such a claim we would run the risk that rights of the individual
would be seen as worthy of the people's allegiance in a deeper way than
are decisions by the collective. These are risks that our constitution does
not permit us to run.
My argument is not that these foundational claims are false. And it is
not that "multiple repositories of power" is true, as a foundational claim.
That is, I do not support an irreducible middle as true in the sense that one
believes a comprehensive doctrine such as Christianity or Liberalism to betrue. The multiple repositories of power position of our constitution,
rather, prohibits the acceptance of foundationalist constitutional claims as
a second-order matter, to insure against the hegemony of any locus or
theory of authority. A violent middle is thus created, and it is in this
violent middle that we must continue to struggle for the respect that
authority can bring, but can never lock in. And I mean real violence: The
struggle between democracy and rights will sometimes play itself out in
battles or in criminal acts of disobedience. The struggle for authority
helps preserve both sides of this debate, and allows for temporal periods
of coexistence (e.g., all the years we are not in a Civil War or its
equivalent) and spatial areas of coexistence (e.g., the Amish living
alongside other Americans).
1996]
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues
This argument might seem akin to Rawls' argument that political
liberalism does not assert the truth of the comprehensive doctrine
"Liberalism" but rather insists that competing comprehensive doctrines
agree on mutually acceptable rules of political order." The similarity is
that I have argued not for the truth of the comprehensive doctrine
"Multiple Repositories of Power" but instead for the acceptance of such
a doctrine as the best way to explain our constitution and as necessary to
achieve the second-order (i.e. nonfoundational) goal of fractured authority.
But Rawls' political liberalism is too focused on centralized government;
it fails to acknowledge the legitimacy of claims from the fringe, of claims
from those comprehensive doctrines that cannot abide the rules of public
reason and the overlapping consensus. I want to give those outsiders
equal time, and to insist that our constitution compels that their de-
mands---often of disruption and separation--be as much a part of the
center as centralized government itself.
D. Two Objections Regarding My Treatment of Rights-
Foundationalism
Two objections might arise regarding my insistence that rights-
foundationalism is no more consistent with a multiple repositories of
power theory than is foundationalist democracy. First, one might argue
that the multiple repositories of power theory that I have advanced is itself
a foundationalist theory, with strong affinities for rights-foundationalism
over democracy. That is because rights-foundationalism points more
directly toward the fracturing of political authority than does democracy,
which appears to be an authority-consolidating position. But I do not
support fractured political authority based in either individual self-
government or separate normative communities as foundational. I do
believe that collective self-government (say, through majority decision) has
an important role to play in competing for the people's allegiance. In
other words, although the multiple repositories of power theory (read:"our constitution") demands that authority be fractured and that no
foundational claim of authority be accepted, this demand need not be
carried out through devolving all sovereignty back to individuals and small
communities. It is fine for majorities and the federal government to be
among the repositories of power.
Second, it is relatively easy to see how democracy as foundational risks
alienating self-government to the government of the "other." But one
might think that the problem of privileging rights-foundationalism is
anarchy rather than tyranny. In this sense, while tyranny is the bad end
13. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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of collective self-government, anarchy is the bad end of individual self-
government. But anarchy is a type of tyranny. At some point, individual
self-government stops being law given to the self and becomes the tyranny
of desire. Collective self-government tames this desire, just as rights cabin
the excesses of collective self-government. Thus, allowing the
foundationalism of rights does risk alienating self-government to the
government of the "other," because the self ruled by desire is a self
captured by the "other."
E. Summary
Efforts to locate a foundational theory of American constitutionalism
cannot succeed, because our constitution incorporates an
antifoundationalist principle. The principle is of multiple repositories of
power, and it demands not only that the people's sovereignty be delegated
to various levels of agents and retained through various mechanisms of
rights, but also that foundational constitutional theories, which privilege
certain loci of power, be rejected. We reject these theories not because
they are false or because some ultimate middle position is true, but rather
because accepting any foundational constitutional theory as true would be
to assert that the people's allegiance ought to be pulled in that direction,
that other loci of power ought to lose ground. But then we would lose our
insurance against the rule of the other; we would lose our most important
tool in the preservation of government by the people. Multiple reposito-
ries of power would be jeopardized by accepting either democracy or
rights-foundationalism as primary, and, because multiple repositories of
power are central to preserving self-government (in any form), we must
reject constitutional foundationalism as inconsistent with our constitution.
A further word about the significance of multiple repositories of power
in the American constitutional order: We have domesticated revolution.
Citizens have the responsibility for interpreting the constitution daily. We
have domesticated a constant, acceptable debate: the struggle over loci of
authority occurs regularly, self-consciously. The legitimacy of government
is always open, always front and center. By keeping the question of
legitimacy always open, we hold off instability. The domestication of
revolution is januslike: it tames and quiets the revolutionary urge, yet it
personalizes the stakes and brings the blood to boil. Moreover, article V
of our constitution is a high hurdle to formal change, but that is a good
thing. It helps to domesticate revolution, to ensure that change occurs
within the system rather than through systemic upheavals. Because the
question of legitimacy and the appropriate font of authority is constantly
open, the allegiance of the people may shift within the constitutional order.
Similarly, the concept of entrenchment (rights or powers) is deeply
1996]
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problematic in our system, because entrenchment entails undomesticating
the question of legitimacy.
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE IRREDUCIBLE CONSTITUTION
The religion clauses of our constitution are a paradigmatic case of the
multiple repositories of power theory, and of the irreducibility of the
constitution. One might understand the core value of the clauses to be the
promotion of religious pluralism.' Religious pluralism is one of our
constitution's most important representations of antifoundationalism.
Government is barred from recognizing one religion as the true religion;
this ensures against a type of concentration of power, power that would
blend governmental office with religious authority.
Although many might agree that religious pluralism is the (or a) core
value of the religion clauses, the disagreements center around what means
best promote the end of religious pluralism. Imagine a constitution with
a free exercise clause but no establishment clause. That constitution
would, if taken seriously, advance significantly the cause of religious
pluralism. But that constitution would be consistent with a government
that endorsed and otherwise supported a particular religion. So long as
other religions were left alone, one could argue that religious pluralism
would be maintained.
The establishment clause, our unique contribution to the advancement
of religious pluralism, can be understood as yet another mechanism of
ensuring against foundationalism. It was not enough to protect the free
exercise of religion; governmental endorsement of or support for a
particular religion, although not directly intruding on the freedom to
practice other religions, could easily lead to the erosion of those other
religions. The establishment clause fits snugly with the multiple
repositories of power instantiated elsewhere in our constitution (separation
of powers, federalism, political freedoms, freedoms of nomic communities)
by depriving majorities of the power to concretize power. The establish-
ment clause is, importantly, an antimajoritarian device; it tells the
dominant religion not to use governmental power to advance its mission.
Even if one adopts this understanding, or a version of it, one still might
contend that although the establishment clause bars the actual establish-
ment of a governmental religion, other types of governmental endorsement
of or support for a religion are valid. (All agree that government may not
coerce religious belief or practice; I am going to assume that the
anticoercion principle is captured in the free exercise clause.) But it is
consistent with the pervasive fear of concentrated power to view the
14. See Michael W. McConnell. Accommodation of Religion. 1985 SuP. CT. REV. I. 14-24.
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establishment clause as a prophylactic device against majoritarian tyranny.
Most of the checks against constitutional foundationalism are of this
variety. When we insist that the President and Congress both play a role
in lawmaking, when we deprive the federal government of certain powers
vis-a-vis the states, when we refuse to allow a city to adopt a discretionary
licensing scheme for speech--4n all of these areas, and others, we rely not
on proof that the indiscretion in question has, already, trampled competing
fonts of power. Instead, we reach these structural decisions (structural
even in the rights area) to ensure against accrued agglomerations of power,
which do not arise in a day, but over time. The establishment clause as
a prophylactic device against majoritarian capture of the government for
religious ends makes sense in light of our other constitutional commit-
ments.
Thus, the question in any case brought under the religion clauses should
be: Does the governmental action in question advance or inhibit the cause
of religious pluralism? Governmental action reasonably understood to
endorse or support the majority religion inhibits the cause of religious
pluralism, while governmental action reasonably understood to assist
minority religions advances the cause of religious pluralism. The hardest
cases are those in which governmental action is reasonably understood as
helping religions equally. I will discuss these various cases in Parts II.A.
and B.
Although much of this Part will discuss antifoundationalism through the
preservation of religious pluralism, I argued earlier that our constitutional
antifoundationalism privileges neither democracy nor rights. The
centrifugal force of religious pluralism may (and should) be counteracted
by the centripetal force of the government seeking, through persuasion,
rather than coercion, an American common ground. Among other things,
this means that the government may teach secular values in public settings,
such as schools. I will take this matter up in Part II.C.
A. Cases that Should be Easy
1. Laws Enacted with a Predominant, Expressly Religious Purpose
When a religious majority captures the legislative process to achieve
doctrinal religious ends, what is it up to? How should we categorize this
sort of legislative behavior? Is it merely a group of citizens expressing
their views on which laws should be enacted? It should be a rather
straightforward proposition that such legislative capture is a means toward
the end of using the government and its system of laws to instantiate
God's laws. Most scholars agree that if a law lacks a plausible secular
purpose it cannot stand. But many scholars argue that if a law has a
1996]
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plausible secular purpose, it should be upheld even if we all know that the
law was enacted for a predominantly, expressly religious purpose. What
is the distinction between these two types of law? It cannot turn on the
purpose or dominant force behind the legislation, because by definition
that force is, in both cases, a religious one. That is, in both cases the
majority advances the legislation to achieve a doctrinal religious end. (If
the majority is seeking to do something else, then I agree we have a
different case.) Likewise, the distinction cannot turn on whether the
resulting law aids the majority's religion, because in both cases the law
does precisely that. So the distinction must be from the point of view of
those who do not follow the majority's religion, that is, the religious
minorities in the jurisdiction in question.
Consider two laws: Law A requires the public schools in the jurisdic-
tion to teach Christian fundamentalism; Law B requires the public schools
in the jurisdiction to cease teaching evolution. Assume that both laws are
enacted through expressly religious arguments that predominate in the
legislative process. In both cases, the majority achieves what it believes
to be an important religious goal, and in both cases the majority uses the
machinery of government to achieve this goal. In case A, there appears
to be no legitimate secular purpose for the law, and my guess is that most
scholars would agree it should be invalidated under the establishment
clause. In case B, one could easily articulate a plausible secular purpose,
as Justice Black did in Epperson v. Arkansas,'5 such as avoiding the
teaching of a controversial issue, or, perhaps, spending class time on other
matters considered more important. Many scholars today are uneasy about
the holdings of Epperson and its progeny, precisely because there appear
to be plausible secular purposes in (at least some of) these cases. But
since in both case A and case B the actual legislative process was
predominated by religious argumentation and in both case A and case B
the religious majority used the legislative process to achieve a religious
end, the difference must turn on the point of view of the religious
minority. Why, though, should we believe that the rights of the religious
minority are affected in a different way in either of these cases? From the
viewpoint of a member of a religious minority in the jurisdiction in
question, in both cases the legislative process has been commandeered for
the precise end that our constitution forbids, the instantiation through law
of the doctrine of a preferred religion. In both cases, members of religious
minorities would have reason to be concerned that the majority is using
the power of government to establish the preferred religion as true, to seek
converts, to collapse repositories of power by uniting the secular power of
government with the religious power of the dominant sect. Laws not
enacted through predominantly, expressly religious arguments, but that
15. 393 U.S. 97, 112-14 (1968).
[Vol. 7:293
The Irreducible Constitution
accord with the tenets of (say) the majority religion, do not create similar
harm to members of religious minorities, because the mere coincidence of
law with religious tenets does not show minorities that the legislative
process has been converted into a conduit for theocracy.
Thus, the Court correctly decided Epperson, Stone, Wallace, and
Edwards.16 Those cases are important bulwarks against the capture of
government for majoritarian religious interests; they remind legislators and
others involved in the legislative process that government may not be used
as a tool for the endorsement or advancement of foundational religious
values. The requirement that such values be translated into secular terms
accords respect for religious minorities, signaling to them that the
government is not being used in a way that threatens to harm religious
pluralism.
2. Governmental Sponsorship of Religious Symbols
As with laws enacted because of a predominant, expressly religious
purpose, governmental sponsorship of religious symbols is another overt
means of using the machinery of government to endorse and advance the
preferred religion. Whether intended or not, the message sent to minority
religions is that the government is not fully theirs, that a preferred set of
religious beliefs exists. Additionally, permitting government to endorse
its preferred religious symbols helps the majority religion advance its
cause and gain the allegiance of more adherents. Thus, the establishment
clause is violated in these cases in a straightforward fashion: The
dominant religion has used the apparatus of government to advance its
cause, gain adherents, and (whether intentionally or not) signal to religious
minorities that the government has merged (at least to some degree) with
the church, relegating the minorities to less-favored citizen status.
In both the symbols cases and the preceding set of cases (enacting
legislation through predominant, expressly religious arguments), the goal
of religious pluralism is jeopardized through the governmentally backed
hegemony of the favored religion. The dominant religion is not, of course,"established" through any single legislative act. If one accepts, however,
the establishment clause as a prophylactic device against such a result,
then one can accept the invalidation of laws that tend toward establishment
and those that all at once set up a state religion.
If one agrees that the government should not be permitted to sponsor
religious symbols but thinks that laws passed through predominantly
religious argumentation are constitutional if they are backed by a plausible
secular purpose, consider this: Assume Congress repeals the Endangered
16. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam);
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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Species Act, and a state decides to enact its own Endangered Species Act.
Virtually all of the legislators are observant Christians, and virtually all of
the legislative arguments for the Act invoke religious authority. The Act
includes authorization for an advertising campaign. Billboards go up
proclaiming "Serve Christ-Preserve Endangered Species." It is clear to
passersby that the state has sponsored the billboards. I imagine that many
scholars would consider the billboards to be unconstitutional. But why are
they any more unconstitutional than the Act itself, passed precisely
because of the stated legislative purpose to serve Christ?
3. Judicial Authority to Require Exemptions for Religion
In the prior two sections, I argued that when the religious majority
captures the legislative process for patently doctrinal purposes, the
establishment clause is violated because of the threat to religious pluralism
from such a merger of dominant religion with governmental apparatus.
The government can harm the cause of religious pluralism in a more
indirect way, as well. When government enacts laws that disparately
impact certain minority religions, often this is because of neglect rather
than intent. 7 Nonetheless, such laws can seriously damage minority
religions, and the Court, Congress, and the academy have struggled
mightily to resolve the problem. The difficulties here are well known: On
the one hand, neglect as well as intent can fuel legislation that threatens
core aspects of minority religions, and it seems that judges could spot
these instances and require exemptions to help preserve the flourishing of
such religions. On the other hand, problems of applying this principle
abound:'8 How do we know if the claimant possesses sincere religious
beliefs? How can we (or should we) distinguish between a religious claim
and a secular claim of conscience? Even if.we can solve these two
problems, should courts order exemptions in all cases, or must they draw
lines (would we really grant an exemption for child sacrifice?), and if they
must draw lines, how? What counts as a substantial burden on religion or
a compelling government interest to countervail (in the language of
Congress' effort in this area, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act)?
Should not we be concerned that the vagaries of application will lead to
(perhaps unintentional) judicial discrimination in favor of some minority
religions and against others?
The question boils down to whether the difficulties and costs of
judicially enforced exemptions are greater or less than the benefits of
17. Laws that intentionally discriminate against religious groups clearly violate the free exercise
clause. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993).
18. See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 7 J. LAW & RELIGION 363 (1989).
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awarding such exemptions. Absent a clear sense that the costs of
exemptions outweigh the benefits, the default rule should favor exemp-
tions, for exemptions will help at least some members of some minority
religions whereas the absence of exemptions will help precisely zero
members of minority religions. Furthermore, judicially crafted exemptions
to bolster religious pluralism should not be thought to violate the
establishment clause, because such exemptions will not be advancing the
dominant religion.
4. Legislative Authority to Accommodate Religion
As with judicial exemptions under the free exercise clause, legislatively
crafted exemptions for minority religions do not violate the establishment
clause, because they neither endorse nor support the dominant religion.
Such legislative exemptions--commonly called "accommoda-
tions"--merely reflect the majority's respect for minority communities,
and may be given to religious or nonreligious communities alike.
One type of challenge to legislative accommodation is similar to the
challenges to judicial exemptions: They might not be handed out with
equal respect to all minority religions; the legislature is bound to favor
some and harm others. 9 Again, though, absent clear proof that this is
happening, the default position should be to permit legislative accommoda-
tion of minority religions (as well as other, nonreligious communities), for
allowing accommodations will advance the cause of religious pluralism,
while forbidding them will leave all minority religions subject to the
sweeping dictates of general legislation enacted often in ignorance of the
impact on those religions. (We should also police legislation to ensure
nondiscrimination among minority religions, to the extent possible.)
The accommodation cases have proved difficult for an additional reason.
Unlike the exemptions cases, where it is almost always apparent that a law
favored by the majority has harmed, inadvertently, a minority community,
some laws supported as accommodations of religion do not lift burdens on
minority religions, but rather help the majority advance its own religious
cause. For example, organized prayer in public schools and government
sponsored religious symbols have sometimes been defended as "accommo-
dations" of religion. Indeed, the word "accommodation" could be used,
reasonably within the English language, to describe any law that makes the
practice of religion easier. But we must maintain the line between the
majority's using legislation openly to advance its religious ends (which
threatens the goal of religious pluralism) and the majority's using
legislation to ease burdens on minority groups, religious or otherwise.
19. See Ira C. Lupu. Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against the Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).
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B. Cases that Should be Hard
Legislation that is advanced for predominant, expressly religious
purposes, and government sponsorship of religious symbols may be seen
as the flip-side of judicial exemptions and legislative accommodations.
The former two types of case threaten religious pluralism because they
involve majoritarian capture of the legislative process, at the expense of
religious minorities. The latter two types of case advance religious
pluralism because they involve governmental solicitude toward burdened
minority religions. All four types of case should be considered easy. The
majority does not need the help of government to thrive, and its use of
government to advance its religious agenda, especially when this is done
openly (as when expressly religious arguments are advanced for law or
when government endorses or supports religious symbols), signals the
minorities that church and government have begun merging, and since it
is not the minorities' church, it cannot now be fully their government.
When government lifts burdens on minority religions, through either
judicial exemptions or legislative accommodations, these problems do not
exist.
Funding cases, on the contrary, are hard, precisely because it is unclear
whether the laws in question primarily advance the majority's religious
agenda or primarily assist in the cause of religious pluralism. A law that
funds private, religious schools, might in some jurisdictions be a way for
the majority to opt out of funding public schools and funnel most of those
tax dollars into the majority's preferred private, religious schools. In other
jurisdictions, such a law might primarily benefit minority religions, or
might equally benefit all religions. The best test, perhaps, would be a case
by case empirical approach that would ensure against government funds
flowing primarily to majoritarian religious institutions, but that would
permit funding of private, religious schools to advance the cause of
religious pluralism.
Unfortunately, in this setting a further problem arises. For many
citizens, channeling tax dollars to religious institutions constitutes a brand
of coercion, and raises, perhaps, a free exercise clause problem. This
concern is present even if one's own religious institution is benefited; so
long as tax dollars are channeled to at least one institution other than one's
own, coercion can be raised as a concern. (Some might also object that
even their own religious institution should not be supported through
governmental coercion, but I leave that argument aside.) The coercion-
based objection to even equal government funding of religious institutions
is deeply rooted in the American experience. If the taxation in question
were meant to support the majority's religious institutions only or
primarily, then the establishment clause would be violated (and we would
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not have to address the free exercise clause claim). But the types of
funding schemes most often advanced these days spread money widely
among religious institutions, so the establishment clause argument
weakens, but the free exercise objection remains. The objection is: It
violates my religious liberty for the government to compel me to support
your religion, even if my religion is supported as well. Religion should
be a matter for private conscience and not for governmental intervention.
If the government is acting to lift a burden from its own intervention (as
in the exemptions or accommodation cases), then the burden-lifting is an
appropriate counterweight. But absent such burden-lifting, governmental
action that supports religion disrupts the voluntarist baseline of our
religious tradition.
It is important to remember that this objection is not the one I have
made throughout this essay. That is, it is not an objection based in the
need to preserve multiple repositories of power, through the mechanism
of religious pluralism and its attendant tools that prevent majoritarian
tyranny and enable minority freedom. It is a different sort of objection,
based in a thick conception of coercion that we do not normally adopt;
after all, one cannot usually demand a tax refund when tax dollars are
spent on a project one deems abhorrent to conscience. I cannot resolve
here whether the voluntarist objection to government funding of religious
institutions should carry the day.
C. Government Speech
So far I have discussed the need to fracture authority by depriving the
religious majority of the power to use government to advance its doctrinal
ends, while enabling government to make life easier for religious
minorities. The irreducibility of our constitution, however, demands that
fractured authority be deemed no more foundational than centralized
authority. Otherwise, the people would have good reason to pledge their
allegiance to self, or family, or religion, but not to the government that
they share. As I argued in part I, our constitution no more countenances
the foundationalism of fractured power than it does the foundationalism
of centralized power. Accordingly, government has a legitimate role to
play in competing for the allegiance of the people. In other words,
government may seek to advance common goals and shared aspirations,
while it permits individuals, families, and religious groups to foster
separate rather than shared values. The establishment clause places a
check on government's role as the source of common ground, but apart
from that check, government may use its power to persuade, even though
its power to coerce is limited by the free speech and free exercise clauses,
among other.
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Thus, government may legitimately sponsor education and advance
secular values in the public schools. Again, remember the package:
Government must also allow private education to flourish, and there is a
good argument that government may, if it chooses, help parents pay for
such education. But a thriving public school system (a reality in some
places only) helps to pull disparate communities together, and gives us all
an opportunity to see what it is like to moderate sectarian values in the
name of constructing an American people. True, public schools will often
advance values favored by some and not others, and public schools will
(in part because of the establishment clause) advance values sympathetic
to some religions and not others. But so long as religious liberty is
permitted to flourish in the private sector, we must accept that government
will advocate ends with which we disagree, even with our tax dollars.. To
insist otherwise--to insist that government not act in a normatively
sectarian fashion, or at least not in the public schools-is to privilege
fractured power over the power of government as spokesperson for the
collective. The antifoundationalism of our constitution, however, forbids
such privileging.
D. Conclusion: Treating Religion as Special
It is hard to argue that religion is not a special subject matter for our
constitution. That would require some fancy footwork around the opening
clauses of the bill of rights. But increasingly scholars seek to assimilate
religion to other sources of value, often in the name of equality. One
group of scholars has pushed for allowing religious arguments in the
lawmaking process, even if such arguments dominate and result in
legislation.20 A central contention is that religious arguments are no
more based on faith than is any other type of argument, and that they are
no more inaccessible to nonbelievers than is any other type of argument.
Those who want to advocate religious reasons for legislation must be
treated equally, it is maintained, to those who want to advocate secular
reasons for legislation. Other scholars have suggested that judicial
exemptions should be awarded for both religious and secular con-
science.2 If person A cannot obey a law because of her religion, and
person B cannot obey a law because of her secular beliefs, the case for an
exemption should be the same for both. These people should be treated
equally, it is maintained.
20. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993); Larry Alexander. Liberalism.
Religion. and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993).
21. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basisfor Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245 (1994).
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One of the most important underanalyzed issues in the religion clause
literature is whether a contemporary view of equality requires that the
above arguments be accepted, or, rather, whether a different understanding
of religion in our constitutional tradition demands that they be rejected.
In my view, the arguments are wrong, but to show that they are wrong,
one would have to look at, among other things, how the framers viewed
religion, how the Civil War amendments altered the constitutional value
of equality, and how twentieth century developments in both liberty and
equality jurisprudence have or have not rendered the plain language of the
religion clauses less than what it seems.
But that is a project for another day. For today, I have tried to describe
a view of our constitution that rejects its reduction to democracy or to
rights, that insists instead that our constitution is irreducible by design, that
our constitution rejects foundationalism and depends upon a constant
tension between the collective will and the separate forces that continually
threaten to pull the collective apart. It is only through such an ongoing
battle for the allegiance of the people that the federation that is the United
States of America can remain both strong and unique. And in the religion
clauses, we have a paradigmatic example of our constitution's commitment
to this ongoing struggle.
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